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Stock Price Informativeness, Cross-Listings and Investment Decisions
We show that a cross-listing allows a ﬁrm to make better investment decisions because
it enhances stock price informativeness. This theory of cross-listings yields several predic-
tions. In particular, it implies that the sensitivity of investment to stock prices should be
larger for cross-listed ﬁrms. Moreover, the increase in value generated by a cross-listing
(the “cross-listing premium”) should be positively related to the size of growth opportuni-
ties and negatively related to the quality of managerial information. We also analyze the
eﬀects of the geography of ownership (the distribution of holdings between foreign and do-
mestic investors) on the cross-listing premium. In particular, we show that the sensitivity
of the cross-listing premium to the size of growth opportunities increases when holdings
(resp. market shares) become more evenly distributed between foreign and domestic in-
vestors (resp. markets). Last, we show that concentration of trading in the home market
(“ﬂow-back”) can indeed increase the cross-listing premium for some ﬁrms.
Keywords : Cross-listings, cross-listings premium, price informativeness, investment
decisions, ﬂow-back, ownership.1 Introduction
Multiple listings of a given ﬁrm on several exchanges is an enduring phenomenon. Cross-
listings in national markets were frequent (see Gehrig and Fohlin (2005) for Germany).
Moreover, transatlantic cross-listings have been observed as early as the 18th century
(Sylla, Wilson, Wright (2004)) and the number of non-U.S. ﬁrms seeking a listing in the
U.S. has more than doubled over the nineties (see Karolyi (2006)). Yet, the determinants
and eﬀects of the cross-listings decisions are still not fully understood (see Karolyi (2006)
for a discussion). We advance a new explanation for this phenomenon and we propose
several testable predictions regarding (i) the eﬀects of cross-listings on ﬁrm value and (ii)
the factors aﬀecting the decision to cross-list.
We show theoretically that managers of cross-listed ﬁrms make more eﬃcient invest-
ment decisions because their stock price is more informative. Accordingly, a cross-listing
can increase the value of a ﬁrm. Our approach hinges upon the hypothesis that ﬁrm man-
agers can learn information from stock prices, as in recent theories developed by Dow and
Gorton (1997) and Subrahamanyam and Titman (1999).1 This hypothesis is consistent
with the well-documented positive correlation between stock prices and investment deci-
sions (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) or Blanchard, Rhee and Summers (1993)).
Moreover, recent empirical ﬁndings suggest that this correlation could indeed stem from
managers learning information contained in stock prices and using this information for
investment decisions.2 For instance, Durnev et al.(2004) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more in-
formative stock prices make more eﬃcient investment decisions while Chen et al. (2005)
show that the sensitivity of investment to stock price increases with stock price informa-
tiveness.3 Given these pieces of evidence, it is natural to investigate improvements in stock
price informativeness as a motivation for cross-listings.
Our results follow from a simple intuition. When markets are informationally seg-
mented, informed investors can trade in, say, the foreign market without immediately af-
fecting prices in the domestic market. Thus, a cross-listing leverages their ability to proﬁt
from their information. Accordingly, a cross-listing has two eﬀects : (i) it induces informed
traders to trade more aggressively on their information and (ii) it increases the number of
informed traders. These two eﬀects enhance the informativeness of their stock price for
cross-listed ﬁrms. Hence, a cross-listing enables managers to obtain more precise informa-
tion from stock prices and, thereby, to make more eﬃcient investment decisions. Hence,
1See also Allen (1993).
2More informative stock prices can also help to discipline managers and thereby aﬀect ﬁrms’ values
(see Holmstr¨ om and Tirole (1993)).
3See also Yook (2005) and Markovitch, Steckel and Yeung (2005).
1the value of a cross-listing increases with the size of growth opportunities and ﬁrms with
suﬃciently large growth opportunities beneﬁt from a cross-listing. Interestingly, growth
opportunities appear to be an important factor for explaining the cross-listing decision and
the related price eﬀects (see for instance Pagano et al.(2002) or Doidge et al.(2004)).
There exist several explanations for cross-listings (see Karolyi (1998) or Karolyi (2005)
for reviews). In particular, cross-listings can be a way to (i) overcome investment barriers
(“segmentation hypothesis”), (ii) increase the ﬁrm visibility (“recognition hypothesis”),
(iii) enhance ﬁrm liquidity, (iv) signal the quality of the ﬁrm and (v) commit to restrain
expropriation from minority shareholders by controlling shareholders (Coﬀee (1999) and
Stulz (1999)). These explanations yield several predictions about the determinants of the
cross-listing decision. They have also been used to interpret the price eﬀects associated
with cross-listings. For instance, Doidge et al.(2004) show that there is a “cross-listing
premium” for ﬁrms cross-listed in the U.S. (i.e. these ﬁrms have a larger Tobin-q than,
otherwise similar, non cross-listed ﬁrms) and that this premium is larger for ﬁrms from
countries with poor legal protections for minority shareholders. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the idea that a cross-listing can act as a bonding mechanism because governance
regulations are more stringent in the U.S.
Our model does not rule out these explanations but it identiﬁes another channel through
which a cross-listing could aﬀect a ﬁrm value : a cross-listing improves stock price infor-
mativeness and thereby contributes to the eﬃciency of investment decisions. We show
that many implications of the model are consistent with well-documented stylised facts
regarding cross-listings. In particular, stock price volatility, a proxy for stock price infor-
mativeness in the model, should increase after a cross-listing. In line with this prediction,
Fernandes and Ferreira (2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variations increase after a
cross-listing for ﬁrms from developed countries. The model generates additional predic-
tions that can be used to distinguish it from other theories of cross-listings. The main
testable implications are as follows:
1. For a given ﬁrm, the sensitivity of its investment decisions to stock price should
increase when it becomes cross-listed.
2. The sensitivity of the cross-listing premium to the size of growth opportunities should
increase when ownership becomes more evenly distributed between foreign and do-
mestic retail investors or, equivalently in the theory, when trading becomes less
concentrated in one market.
3. The cross-listing premium and the sensitivity of this premium to the size of growth
2opportunities decrease with the quality of managerial information (as the informa-
tional beneﬁt of a cross-listing becomes then relatively smaller)
4. The increase in stock price volatility after a cross-listing should be larger when trading
becomes less concentrated in one market.
We also show that the informational beneﬁt of a cross-listing vanishes when markets are
informationally integrated. This ﬁnding suggests to explain the dynamics of cross-listings
(and delisting) decisions by the evolution of the level of informational integration among
markets. In particular, increased informational integration between European stock mar-
kets could be the cause of the decline in the number of European cross-listings (documented
by Pagano et al.(2002)).
We model multi-market trading as in Chowdry and Nanda (1991).4 Our model ex-
tends their framework in two ways. First, we endogenize the number of informed traders
(Chowdry and Nanda (1991) focus on the case with a single informed trader). This is
important as, in the model, the beneﬁt of a cross-listing is magniﬁed by the entry of new
informed traders when the ﬁrm cross-lists. Moreover, we explicitly model the decision to
cross-list by a ﬁrm manager and we analyze in details the impact of a cross-listing on the
ﬁrm value. In particular, we relate this impact to the geography of ownership (i.e. the
holdings of foreign and domestic retail investors) and the distribution of trading activity
between the domestic and the foreign market.
On this front, we ﬁnd that cross-listed ﬁrms with relatively large (resp. small) growth
opportunities experience an increase (resp. decrease) in their valuation when (a) owner-
ship becomes more evenly distributed between foreign and domestic retail investors or (b)
trading becomes more evenly distributed between the foreign and the domestic market.
These ﬁndings suggest to relate time-series variations in the valuation of cross-listed ﬁrms
(e.g. the cross-listing premium documented in Doidge et al.(2004)) to variations in the
geography of their ownership or variations in the market share of, say, the domestic mar-
ket. Second, they provide a rationale for the decision to cross-list when ﬁrms correctly
anticipate that there will be little trading on the foreign market. This is important as
recent studies (e.g. Halling et al.(2003)) indicate that trading in some cross-listed ﬁrms
concentrates on the domestic market (so called “ﬂow-back” phenomenon). In our model,
this concentration is indeed optimal for ﬁrms with relatively small growth opportunities.
4Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2003) also consider a model of multi-market trading. In contrast with
Chowdry and Nanda (1991), they do not assume that some traders are captive in the foreign market or
the domestic market. Other models of multi-market trading include Pagano (1989) and Gehrig, Stahl,
Vives (1996). The purpose of these models is to explain the allocation of trading between markets, not
the decision to cross-list as we do in this paper.
3Our paper adds to the strand of literature relating cross-listing eﬀects to changes in
the informational environment of the ﬁrm. Cantale (1996) shows that a cross-listing acts a
signaling device. By cross-listing on markets with more stringent disclosure requirements
than their home market, ﬁrms signal that they have high quality projects. The role of
disclosure requirements is also analyzed in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2004).5 In their
model, ﬁrms cross-list to (i) take advantage of higher transparency induced by more strin-
gent disclosure requirements on the foreign market and (ii) access investors with greater
expertise (“skilled analysts”) in evaluating their ﬁrm. In all these theories, managers are
assumed to have more information than investors on the quality of their project. Rather,
we consider a situation in which ﬁrm managers can learn additional information from stock
prices.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the cross-listing decision when ex-
changes are informationally segmented whereas section 4 consider the case in which ex-
changes are informationally integrated. Section 5 discusses the testable implications of the
results and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides proofs and formal arguments.
2 The Model
The Firm
Following Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999), we consider a ﬁrm with assets in place
and a growth opportunity. The ﬁnal payoﬀ on the assets in place is:
e V = ¯ V + ˜ δ + ˜ , (1)
where ˜ δ and ˜  are independent and normally distributed random variables with zero means.
Their variances are respectively σ2
δ and σ2




0 + ˜ δ)K − 0.5K
2), (2)
where K is the size of the investment in the growth opportunity and S is the size of the
growth opportunity. Importantly, the payoﬀ of the growth opportunity is correlated with
the payoﬀ on the assets in place as both payoﬀs depend on ˜ δ (e.g. the growth opportunity
5Huddart et al.(1999) also consider the role of disclosure requirements but their analysis focuses on
the case in which ﬁrms must list on only one market. Firms listed in high disclosure environment are
willing to cross-list in low disclosure environment since there is no additional cost (in terms of information
revelation) for them. The reverse is not always true (see their section 5.1). Baruch and Saar (2005) and
Foucault and Parlour (2004) analyze the determinants of the listing decision but, in these papers, ﬁrms
cannot cross-list.
4is an extension of the assets in place). All payoﬀs are realized in period 3. Figure 1 depicts
the timing of the model.
INSERT FIG.1 ABOUT HERE
In period 0, the ﬁrm goes public and sells claims on the cash-ﬂows of the assets in
place, but not on the cash-ﬂows of the growth opportunity. As in Subrahmanyam and
Titman (1999), this assumption is not key but necessary for tractability.6 At this date, the
ﬁrm’s manager chooses to list on a single exchange or to dual-list on exchanges located in
countries L and F where L designates the ﬁrm’s home country and F designates a foreign
country.7 In period 1, the ﬁrm stock trades in one or two markets depending on whether
the ﬁrm is cross-listed or not (the trading process is described below).
In period 2, the manager observes the stock price at the end of period 1 and receives
an additional signal, e s2 (“managerial private information”), on the value of the growth
opportunities :
e s2 = e δ + e η (3)
where e η is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
η. Then, she chooses the
size of the investment in the growth opportunity. The manager seeks to maximize the total
expected value of the ﬁrm (including the value of the growth opportunity).
A dual listing involves larger direct costs than a single listing, as a dual listed ﬁrm
must pay additional listing fees and investment-banking fees. It must also comply with a
variety of listing and reporting requirements that can involve substantial costs for a ﬁrm
(see Bancel and Mittoo (2001)). We denote by Σ the incremental cost of a dual-listing.
Shareholders and Ownership Structure
At date 0, the shares sold by the ﬁrm are purchased by two types of investors :
• Sophisticated investors. These investors can trade in markets L and F provided
the ﬁrm is dual-listed. They can be viewed as ﬁnancial intermediaries (e.g. mutual
funds) who have the expertise and the technology required to engage into multimarket
trading. For instance, they have relationships with brokerage ﬁrms in both markets.
• Unsophisticated investors. These investors exclusively trade in their home country.
6As an illustration, the ﬁrm can be seen as an holding with two distinct (a public and a private)
subsidiaries. The managers of the holding learn information from the stock price of the publicly traded
subsidiary and use it for investment decisions in the privately owned subsidiary .
7It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case with N markets. This extension however
increases the notational burden without providing additional intuitions.
5The ownership base of the ﬁrm is characterized by two parameters α and Φ > 0. Param-
eter Φ designates the fraction of outstanding shares owned by unsophisticated shareholders
(sophisticated investors own a fraction (1−Φ)). When the ﬁrm is cross-listed, this fraction
is split between unsophisticated investors located in countries L and F. Unsophisticated
investors localized in country L owns a fraction Φα and those localized in country F owns
a fraction Φ(1 − α). For the exposition we assume that α ∈ [0.5,1]. The ﬁndings when
α ∈ [0,0.5] are symmetric to those obtained when α ∈ [0.5,1] (e.g. trading concentrates in
the domestic market when α = 1 and the foreign market when α = 0). If the ﬁrm is not
cross-listed then α = 1.8 We refer to α as the geography of ownership as this parameter
determines the distribution of ownership between unsophisticated foreign and domestic
investors.
In period 1, initial shareholders are hit by liquidity shocks and trade in markets L and
F. The total liquidity demand of initial shareholders in period 1, ˜ Z, is assumed to be
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
Z. We have
˜ Z = ˜ ZL + ˜ ZF + ˜ Zs, (4)
where ˜ Zj,j ∈ {L,F}, is the liquidity demand of unsophisticated investors based in country
j and ˜ Zs is the aggregate liquidity demand of sophisticated investors. Liquidity demands
are normally and independently distributed with mean zero. We denote by σ2
j the variance
of ˜ Zj. This variance measures the average size of liquidity demand by a speciﬁc class of
shareholders (since E( ˜ Z2
j) = σ2
j). Intuitively, the liquidity demand of a speciﬁc class of
shareholders increases with the fraction of outstanding shares owned by this class. Thus,













s = (1 − Φ)σ
2
Z. (7)
As shown below α determines the fraction of the total trading volume captured by the
domestic market (its “market share”) when the ﬁrm is cross-listed. There may be a variety
of factors that determine α. For instance, ﬁrms with a large volume of sales abroad or
large ﬁrms are more likely to be familiar or visible to foreign small investors. If investors
8Sophisticated foreign investors can hold shares of the ﬁrm even if it is not cross-listed. The important
point is that a cross-listing attracts some unsophisticated investors. Thus, it should result in an increase
in foreign investors’ holdings. Ammer et al.(2005) show that this eﬀect exists for cross-listings in the
U.S.This eﬀect could be due to familiarity eﬀects as documented in Grinblatt and Kelohajru (2001) for
instance.
6are more willing to invest in familiar ﬁrms then we expect α to decrease with ﬁrm size or
foreign sales. In this paper, we do not attempt to endogenize α as this is not necessary for
our implications.
The Trading Process
We model multimarket trading as in Chowdry and Nanda (1991). The only diﬀerence
with their approach is that the number of informed traders can be larger than 1 and is
endogenous in our model. There are 3 types of participants: (i) liquidity traders, (ii) M
risk-neutral informed traders who observe ˜ δ at cost C and (iii) competitive risk-neutral
market-makers. As sophisticated investors do, informed traders can engage in multimarket
trading.9 Informed and sophisticated traders choose their trading strategy (order size in
each market) to maximize their expected trading proﬁt, under the constraint to trade e Zs
shares for sophisticated investors. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one sophisti-
cated liquidity trader. The geographical location of informed traders and the sophisticated
trader is not important as they can trade in both markets.
We assume that the foreign and the domestic markets operate simultaneously. This
case is relevant in many situations. For instance, trading hours for stocks cross-listed on
European or North american markets overlap.
Informational Integration/Segmentation
In each market, dealers post prices such that they expect to earn zero expected proﬁts
conditional on all available public information. We will analyze two diﬀerent environments:
(i) markets are informationally integrated or (ii) markets are informationally segmented.
As in Domowitz et al. (1998), the level of integration between the two markets is
deﬁned with respect to the speed with which dealers obtain information on quotes or order
ﬂow prevailing in the competing market.10 When markets are informationally integrated,
dealers in one market can instantaneously reﬂect the information available in the competing
market (e.g. order ﬂow) into their quotes. Thus, with informational integration, the
clearing price in either market is given by the following zero proﬁt condition:
p(OL,OF) = E(˜ V | ˜ O
i




j is the net order ﬂow in market j with informational integration (that is ˜ Oi
j =
9Menkveld (2002) studies trading in stocks cross-listed in NYSE and Amsterdam. He shows empiri-
cally that there are large traders, informed and uninformed, who strategically trade both in NYSE and
Amsterdam when the two markets operate in parallel.
10In our model, information on prices is identical to information on order ﬂow because, in equilibrium,
there is a one-to-one mapping between prices and order ﬂow.
7Pk=M
k=1 Qi
j(˜ δ) + ˜ Zi
js + ˜ Zj)). Thus, trades take place at identical prices in each market.
Domowitz et al.(1998) study a sample of ﬁrms cross-listed in Mexico and in the U.S and
reject the hypothesis of informational integration of the Mexican and the U.S. markets.
Werner and Kleidon (1996) reach similar conclusions for a sample of ﬁrms cross-listed in
the London stock Exchange and NYSE (see also Biais and Martinez (2003)). One reason
for which markets are informationally segmented is that, at a given point in time, dealers
in one market do not immediately observe trades occuring in the competing market at that
point in time. This implies that dealers in a given market absorb order imbalances in their
own market without knowing concomitant order imbalances in the competing market.11
Formally, with informational segmentation, the price posted in market j is given by
pj(O
s






j is the net order ﬂow in market j with informational integration.
Thus, with informational segmentation, trades occuring simultaneously in the domestic
and the foreign market can take place at diﬀerent prices. This creates temporary diﬀerences
between the reported transaction prices in each market. Of course, these divergences do
not last as dealers in one market eventually get quote and trades information from the
competing market or because cross-border arbitrage quickly aligns the prices in the two
markets.12 Hence, the price posted at the beginning of period 2, and observed by the
manager, reﬂects all information available at this time (see Equation (13) below).
Remarks: Some authors (Gehrig (1993), Brennan and Cao (1997) or Kang and Stulz
(1997)) assume that foreign investors are at an informational disadvantage compared to
domestic investors. This informational asymmetry is also a source of market segmentation.
A cross-listing overcomes this segmentation if it results in more abundant information for
foreign investors. Moreover, Pagano et al.(2002) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2003)
argue that cross-listing could be a way to access investors with expertise in valuing ﬁrms
in a speciﬁc industry. These eﬀects are not present in our model because the precision of
the private information or the cost of acquiring information are not country speciﬁc. In
11In practice, traders engaged in multimarket trading uses smart routing systems that give them the
possibility to hit simultaneously quotes posted in diﬀerent markets. Our deﬁnition of informational seg-
mentation is common in the literature on multimarket trading (see Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998),
Chowdry and nanda (1991), Baruch and Saar (2005), Baruch, Karolyi and Lemmon (2003) for instance).
12Eun and Sabberwal (2003) estimate an error-correction model for stocks cross-listed in Canada and
the U.S to study how U.S prices respond to price changes in Canada and vice-versa. Their ﬁndings show
that prices adjust in each market so that the equality of prices between the two markets is maintained
but that the adjustment is not immediate. Interestingly, they also ﬁnd that prices in each market react to
price changes in the competing market, which means that price discovery takes place both in the domestic
(Canada) and the foreign (U.S) markets.
8this way, we focus our analysis on a motivation for cross-listing that has not been analyzed
in earlier studies.
Also, it has often been argued that a cross-listing is a way for ﬁrms to enlarge their
shareholder base. This eﬀect is not present in our model but it could easily be incorporated.
Intuitively, an increase in the number of shareholders has the eﬀect of reducing the number
of shares held by each investor and to diversify liquidity shocks. Thus, an increase in the
investor base after a cross-listing can be formalized by assuming that σ2
Z is smaller when
the ﬁrm is cross-listed. Again, we prefer to hold σ2
Z ﬁxed to better isolate the eﬀects due
to price informativeness on the cross-listing decision.
3 The Cross-Listing Decision with Informational Seg-
mentation
In this section, we analyze the cross-listing decision when markets are informationally
segmented. We proceed as follows. In section 3.1, we derive the equilibrium of the stock
market when the ﬁrm is cross-listed and when it is not. Next, in Section 3.2, we study the
costs and beneﬁts of a cross-listing. We show that a cross-listing enhances the expected
value of growth opportunities but results in larger expected trading costs for liquidity
traders. In Section 3.3, we study under which conditions cross-listing is optimal for the
manager. Throughout, we denote by Mc (resp. Mnc) the number of informed traders when
the ﬁrm is cross-listed (resp. listed only in the domestic market).
3.1 Stock Market Equilibrium with and without a Cross-Listing.
We ﬁrst consider the equilibrium of the stock market when the ﬁrm is cross-listed, for a
given number of informed investors.
Lemma 1 : In equilibrium, when the ﬁrm is cross-listed, dealers in market j post a price
schedule:
P(Oj) = ¯ V + λ
∗
j(α)Oj for j ∈ {L,F}.
The large sophisticated investor splits his order between the two markets so that:
Zjs = ω
∗
j(α)Zs, for j ∈ {L,F}
and an informed trader’s optimal order in market j is:
Qj(δ) = β
∗


















j j ∈ {L,F}.
The result is a straightforward extension of Lemma 1 in Chowdry and Nanda (1991)
when there are several informed traders (Chowdry and Nanda (1991) focus on the case
Mc = 1).13 The equilibrium has the following properties. First, not surprisingly, the
market with the largest proportion of unsophisticated investors turns out to be the most












> 1 iﬀ α >
1
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Second, in order to minimize price impact, the sophisticated investor and informed in-







λL). Finally, the market with the largest proportion of
unsophisticated investors has a greater trading volume because (a) the informed investor
and the sophisticated investor trade relatively more in this market and (b) the size of the
unsophisticated investor’s liquidity demand is larger in this market. In order to formalize
this observation, let consider the following measure of the trading volume in market j:
V olj = V ar( ˜ Oj).
Lemma 1 implies :
V olL
V olF + V olL
= α. (8)
Hence, the market shares of the domestic and the foreign markets are completely deter-
mined by the geography of ownership, α. Not surprisingly, the market share of the foreign
market increases the fraction of outstanding shares owned by unsophisticated foreign in-
vestors. Trading will be highly concentrated in the local market if α is large. In the
limiting case in which the ﬁrm is cross-listed and α = 1, all the trading concentrates in
the domestic market and the foreign market is completely inactive and illiquid (w∗
F = 0,
β∗
F = 0 and λ∗
F = ∞). Several empirical studies document cross-sectional variations in
the market shares (in terms of trading volume) of the domestic and foreign markets (e.g.
Baruch et al.(2003), Pulatkonak and Soﬁanos (1999) or Halling et al.(2003)). Consistent
with Equation (8), Halling et al.(2003) ﬁnd that cross-listed ﬁrms with a large fraction of
U.S. ownership trade more heavily in the U.S.
13The information received by the manager at date 2 does not aﬀect the equilibrium of the stock market
at date 1.
14As in Kyle (1985), λj is a measure of the liquidity of market j since it determines the price impact of
a buy or a sell order. The larger is λj, the smaller is the liquidity of market j.
10Lemma 2 : If the ﬁrm does not cross-list (it lists only in market L), the equilibrium is
as described in Lemma 1 when α = 1 (substituting Mnc with Mc in all formulae).
In the absence of a cross-listing, trading takes place only in the domestic market and
the equilibrium is as described in Lemma 1 when α = 1, accounting for the fact that the
number of informed traders may diﬀer in the two cases.
In equilibrium, informed traders earn proﬁts at the expense of liquidity traders. Let
Lj(α,Φ,Mc) be the aggregate expected trading losses for unsophisticated shareholders
localized in country j and Ls(α,Φ,Mc) be the expected trading losses for the sophisticated
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As dealers break-even, informed traders’ aggregate expected proﬁts, Πc(α,Φ,Mc), are
equal to liquidity traders’ aggregate expected losses. We deduce from the previous equation













α(1 − α) + 1)σ2
δσ2
Z]. (9)
A trader acquires private information if his expected proﬁt exceeds the cost of information,
C. Observe that Πc decreases with the number of informed traders. The number of
informed traders in equilibrium, Mc∗, is such that entry of an additional informed trader
is unproﬁtable. In order to simplify the analysis, we treat the number of informed traders





We obtain informed traders’ aggregate expected proﬁts when the ﬁrm is not cross-listed,
























Using Equations (10) and (12), we obtain the following result.
11Proposition 1 : If α < 1, the number of informed traders is larger when the ﬁrm is
cross-listed than when it lists only in the domestic market (i.e. Mc∗ > Mnc∗).
• Furthermore, the number of informed traders decreases with α (for α ∈ [0.5,1]) and
increases in Φ when the ﬁrm is cross-listed.
• When α = 1, the number of informed traders is identical when the ﬁrm is cross-listed
and when it is not.
When markets are informationally segmented and the ﬁrm is cross-listed, informed
traders can place orders in one market without immediately impacting the price in the
other market. In this case, a cross-listing opens new proﬁt opportunities for informed
traders and they obtain a larger aggregate expected proﬁt than when the ﬁrm has a single
listing. Thus, a cross-listing triggers entry of additional informed traders compared to
a single listing. Consistent with this result, Norhona et al.(1996) ﬁnd that the level of
informed trading has increased for ﬁrms listed on NYSE and AMEX following their dual-
listing on the London Stock Exchange or the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
If α = 1 the equilibrium is identical when the ﬁrm is cross-listed and when it is not.
Hence, from now on, we say that the ﬁrm is cross-listed iﬀ α < 1. When markets are
informationally segmented, concomitant transactions take place at diﬀerent prices in the
domestic and the foreign market. But prices in each market converge to a single value
once dealers in one market observes the price innovation (or order ﬂow) in the competing
market. Hence, the price on markets F and L at the beginning of period 2 is :
P
c





If the ﬁrm has a single listing, the price at the beginning of period 2 is :
P
nc







δ −V ar(e δ | P k
2 ) where k = c if the ﬁrm is cross-listed and k = nc if it is not.
This variable measures the informativeness of the stock price observed at the beginning of
period 2 in a given regime (cross-listed/not cross-listed). Actually, the larger is I(P k
2 ), the
smaller is the residual uncertainty on e δ (V ar(e δ | P k
2 )) after observing the stock price.
Proposition 2 : The informativeness of the stock price is larger when the ﬁrm is cross-




















A cross-listing enhances price informativeness because it generates an increase in the
number of informed traders (Proposition 1). The aggregate trade of informed investors
(i.e. M∗c(QL(δ)+QF(δ))) is thereby more sensitive to their private information when the
ﬁrm is cross-listed than when it is not.15 Hence, the order ﬂow is more informative with a
cross-listing.16
Corollary 1 : When the ﬁrm is cross-listed, the informativeness of the stock price in-
creases with Φ and decreases with α for α ∈ [0.5,1]. It is maximal when α = 0.5.
The ownership structure of the ﬁrm (Φ) and its geography (α) determines the allocation
of informed traders’ orders between each market and thereby the informativeness of the
price system. To see this point, observe that the total trade size of informed investors in


















An increase in Φ unambiguously enlarges informed traders’ aggregate trade size in each
market and, thereby, renders the order ﬂow more informative in each market. An increase
in α induces informed traders to trade more heavily in the home market and less heavily
in the foreign market. Thus, a change in the geography of ownership contributes to make
one market more informative and the competing market less informative. Given these
countervailing eﬀects, the impact of a change in α on price informativeness is unclear.
Diﬀerentiation of equation (15) with respect to α, however, establishes that, overall, price
informativeness is enhanced when the allocation of unsophisticated investors between the
foreign and the domestic market becomes more even.
3.2 Beneﬁts and Costs of Cross-Listings
In period 2, the manager chooses the size of the investment in the growth opportunity
after observing (i) the stock price, P k
2 and (ii) managerial private information, s2. It is
15Actually, it can be checked that Mc∗(βL(α) + βF(α)) > Mnc∗(βL(1)) because Mc∗ > Mnc∗.
16This result also holds if the number of informed traders is exogenous (Mc = Mnc). In this case, the
result is due to the fact that a cross-listing induces each informed investor to trade more aggressively on
his information.




0 + E(e V | e s2,P
k
2 ) (17)
Assuming that, conditional on e δ, e s2 and P k












2 − V ), (18)
where τη = (σ2
η)−1 (the precision of signal η) and τk = (V ar(e δ | P k
2 ))−1. Thus, the invest-
ment in the growth opportunity depends both on (a) the stock price and (b) managerial
information, as both signals are informative.
When informed traders receive a good signal (δ > 0), they buy the stock and the
stock price increases on average (E(P k
2 | δ > 0) − V ) > 0). Thus, for a ﬁxed value
of s2, an increase in the stock price is a positive signal about the value of the growth
opportunity. Conversely, a decrease in price is a negative signal about the value of the
growth opportunity. For this reason, there is a positive relationship between the size of the
investment in the growth opportunity and the stock price. We analyze the determinants
of this relationship in Section 5, when we discuss the implications of the model.
We normalize K∗
0 to zero, which simpliﬁes the derivations without aﬀecting the results.
The expected value of the growth opportunity at date 0 (denoted by EGk) when the ﬁrm






)], k ∈ {c,nc}
Using Equation (17), we rewrite this expression as:
EG












As E(E(˜ δ | s2,P c
2)) = 0, we deduce that the expected value of the growth opportunity is :
EG
k =
SV ar(E(˜ δ | s2,P k
2 ))
2
, k ∈ {c,nc}. (19)
Intuitively, the greater is V ar(E(˜ δ | s2,P k
2 )), the greater is the informativeness of the signals
received by the manager at date 2.18 Hence, the expected value of the growth opportunity
17This assumption is innocuous. It means that the signal received by the manager at date 2 in addition
to the stock prices is independent of the amount of liquidity trading in the stock market at date 1.
18For any random variables X and Y for which the necessary expectations exist,
V ar(Y ) = E(V ar(Y | X)) + V ar(E(Y | X)). Moreover, when X and Y are normally distributed,
V ar(Y | X) is non random. In this case V ar(Y | X) = V ar(Y ) − V ar(E(Y | X)). This property holds
also in the multi-dimensional case. This implies that the larger is V ar(E(Y | X)), the more precise is the
posterior of Y after observing X. Hence, V ar(E(Y | X)) is a measure of the informational content of X
about Y .
14increases with the the informativeness of the stock price. We establish this result in the
next lemma.
Lemma 3 : The expected value of the growth opportunity increases with the informative-
ness of the stock price, I(P k













δ − I(P k
2 )
) for k ∈ {c,nc}. (20)
Intuitively, a more informative stock price enables the manager to make more eﬃcient
investment decision (i.e. to invest more when the marginal return of the investment, δ, is
large). This property holds whether the ﬁrm is cross-listed or not, but the informativeness
of the stock price is larger when the ﬁrm is cross-listed ( Proposition 2). Thus, the expected
value of the growth opportunity when the ﬁrm is cross-listed is larger than when it is not.
We state this central result in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 : (beneﬁt of a cross-listing) For all values of α and Φ, the expected
value of the growth opportunity is larger when the ﬁrm is cross-listed (i.e. EGc > EGnc).





η), is maximal when α = 0.5 and decreases with α. Furthermore, it increases
with Φ and σ2
η.
Interestingly, the impact of a cross-listing on the value of the growth opportunity de-
pends on (i) the ownership of the ﬁrm and (ii) the quality of managerial information (s2).
Changes in ownership that enhances price informativeness (e.g. a more even allocation of
shares between domestic and foreign investors) result in more eﬃcient investment decisions
and thereby a larger expected value for the growth opportunity. When the precision of
managerial information declines, stock price information is more valuable for the man-
ager. As a consequence, the impact of a cross-listing on the expected value of the growth
opportunity becomes larger.
The informational beneﬁt of a cross-listing must be balanced against the costs of a
cross-listing. A cross-listing entails two costs in our model: (i) a direct cost, Σ (listing fees,
compliance costs...) and (ii) an increase in expected trading losses for unsophisticated
liquidity traders. To see this recall that unsophisticated traders’ losses, Lk, are equal to









15where the inequality follows from Proposition 1. The increase in unsophisticated traders’
losses is costly for the ﬁrm because the latter discount their valuation for the ﬁrm by
the size of their expected trading loss (as in H¨ olmstrom and Tirole (1993)). We call this
discount the illiquidity premium.
Corollary 2 : (cost of a cross-listing) The illiquidity premium is larger when the ﬁrm
is cross-listed than when it is not. Furthermore, in equilibrium, the illiquidity premium
depends on the ownership structure of the ﬁrm : it decreases with α and it increases with
Φ.
The illiquidity premium depends on the ownership of the ﬁrm. Intuitively, changes
in the ownership structure that induces more informed trading (i.e. enhances price in-
formativeness) results in larger expected losses for liquidity traders (a greater illiquidity
premium). Thus, the illiquidity premium becomes smaller as trading becomes more con-
centrated on the domestic market or when sophisticated investors hold a greater fraction
of the issue. Overall, changes in ownership enhancing the expected value of the growth
opportunity have an adverse impact on the illiquidity premium, for cross-listed ﬁrms. This
tension is key for our analysis of the eﬀect of a change in ownership on the value of a
cross-listed ﬁrm (see next subsection).
Empirically, the eﬀect of a cross-listing on liquidity is unclear. For Mexican companies,
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998) ﬁnd that, other things equal, trading costs are
larger for cross-listed ﬁrms. In contrast, Noronha et al. (1996) or Foerster and Karolyi
(2000) ﬁnd an increase in trading activity and greater liquidity on both domestic and
foreign markets following a cross-listing. This observation could come from phenomena
that are not captured by our model. In this model, dealers earn zero expected proﬁts
whether the ﬁrm is cross-listed or not. In reality, maybe, market making is not completely
competitive. In this case, a cross-listing could work to reduce domestic dealers’ rents by
increasing intermarket competition. In our set-up, this mechanism would simply reinforce
the incentive to cross-list for a ﬁrm, by alleviating the impact of a cross-listing on the
illiquidity premium.
3.3 The Value of a Cross-Listing with informational Segmenta-
tion
Now, we examine the conditions under which it is optimal for the ﬁrm to cross-list given
the costs and beneﬁts associated to this decision. For a given ownership structure, the
16expected value of the ﬁrm, V c(α,Φ,σ2



























We call ∆V the cross-listing premium. Using the expressions for V c and V nc, we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 4 : Growth opportunities and the cross-listing premium
1. Only ﬁrms with a suﬃciently large growth opportunity choose to cross-list. That is
there exists a threshold S∗such that ∆V > 0 if and only if S > S∗. Moreover S∗
decreases when the manager’s private information (s2) is of lower quality (i.e. σ2
η
increases).
2. The cross-listing premium increases with the size of the growth opportunity, that is
∆V increases with S.
The contribution of the growth opportunity to the total value of the ﬁrm becomes
larger as the size of the growth opportunity increases. For this reason, the positive impact
of a cross-listing on the value of the growth opportunity dominates the cost of cross-listing
when the size of the growth opportunity is large enough. Thus, ﬁrms with large growth
opportunities are more likely to cross-list. Moreover, for a ﬁxed size of the growth oppor-
tunity, the informational beneﬁt of a cross-listing is greater when managerial information
is poor. This yields the second prediction that ﬁrms with more uncertain growth oppor-
tunities (given the information available to managers) are more likely to cross-list. These
predictions are supported by empirical ﬁndings on cross-listings. Pagano, Ro¨ ell and Zech-
ner (2002) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high growth rates and large market-to-book values are
more likely to cross-list. Furthermore, they observe that cross-listed ﬁrms have higher
ratios of R&D expenses per employee. Presumably, the value of growth opportunities is
more uncertain for these ﬁrms as the outcome of R&D is diﬃcult to evaluate. Hence, the
enhancement of price informativeness associated with a cross-listing is more valuable for
these ﬁrms.
17Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004) ﬁnd that ﬁrms cross-listed in the U.S. have a larger
Tobin-q than ﬁrms that do not cross-list. They show that this cross-listing premium is
positively related to indicators of growth opportunities. However, these indicators alone do
not explain entirely the cross-listing premium. Rather, this is the combination of growth
opportunities and the decision to cross-list that results in the premium. Subsequent em-
pirical works have obtained similar conclusions with diﬀerent samples and methodologies
(e.g. Hail and Leuz (2005) or King and Segal (2005)). Our model is consistent with these
observations. The cross-listing premium increases with the size of growth opportunities
(second part of Proposition 4). Moreover, cross-listing is the act that enables the ﬁrm to
enhance the expected value of its growth opportunity. That is, for given growth oppor-
tunities, the expected value of a cross-listed ﬁrm is larger than an otherwise comparable,
but not cross-listed, ﬁrm. The model generates additional predictions regarding the deter-
minants of the sensitivity of the cross-listing premium to the size of growth opportunities
(∂V
∂S) that we discuss in Section 5.
Proposition 5 : Other things equal, the cross-listing premium increases when the quality
of managerial information decreases (i.e. σ2
η).
Intuitively, the informational beneﬁt of a cross-listing is larger when managerial infor-
mation is poor. Accordingly, the impact of a cross-listing on ﬁrm values is larger in this
case. This ﬁnding suggests to use proxies for the quality of managerial information to
explain cross-sectional variations in the cross-listing premium.
The model also implies that the cross-listing premium depends on ownership structure
(Φ) and the geography of its ownership (α) (because these variables aﬀect both the expected
value of growth opportunities and the illiquidity premium for cross-listed ﬁrms; see previous
section). King and Segal (2005) ﬁnd indeed that the cross-listing premium for Canadian
ﬁrms cross-listed in the US is positively related and, largely explained, by the fraction
of shares hold by US investors. Moreover, Ammer et al.(2005) ﬁnd that ﬁrms expecting
a large increase in the fraction of shares owned by foreign investors are more likely to
cross-list.
In our model, the eﬀect of ownership variables on the cross-listing premium is ambigu-
ous, because these variables aﬀect the expected value of the growth opportunity and the
illiquidity premium in opposite ways. In order to get more insights, we analyze the eﬀect
of a change in α on the cross-listing premium with the help of simulations (as it is diﬃcult
to obtain analytical results).
INSERT FIG2. ABOUT HERE
18Figure 2 considers the impact of increasing α on the cross-listing premium (∆V ) for
various sizes of the growth opportunity (S = 30, S = 35, S = 40 and S = 45). Given the
baseline values of the parameters, the manager ﬁnds proﬁtable to cross-list for any value
of α < 1. Thus, a ﬁrm can beneﬁt from a cross-listing even if its trading activity mainly
concentrates in the home market. Interestingly, in some cases, this concentration can even
be optimal. Some studies (e.g. Karolyi (2003), Halling et al.(2003) or Baruch et al.(2003))
show that there is a tendency for trading activity to “ﬂow back” to the domestic market.
Our ﬁnding suggests that ﬂow back can, paradoxically, enhance the value of a cross-listing.
For instance, when S = 30, α∗ = 99% maximizes the cross-listing premium. The optimal
value of α falls to α∗ = 93.2% and α∗ = 77% for S = 35 and S = 40, respectively. More
generally, as the size of the growth opportunity increases, the optimal ownership structure
becomes closer and closer to the ownership structure that maximizes the expected value
of the growth opportunity (i.e. α∗ goes to 50% as S increases, see Proposition 3). In fact
for S = 45, Figure 2 shows that α∗ = 50%.
Thus, the model suggests that the cross-listing premium of ﬁrms with relatively large
growth opportunities will increase when trading becomes more evenly allocated between
the foreign and the domestic market (i.e. when the proportion of foreign unsophisticated
investors increases). In contrast, the cross-listing premium of ﬁrms with relatively small
growth opportunities should increase when trading concentrates in the domestic market.
We have checked that these conclusions were robust for a wide range of parameters. Thus,
the model suggests to explain time-series variations in the cross-listing premium by in-
tertemporal variations in the allocation of trading between the domestic and the foreign
markets. We discuss this implication in more details in Section 5.
These ﬁndings also suggest that ﬁrms should endeavor to control the geography of
ownership. Figure 2 reveals that the value of α that maximizes the cross-listing premium
increases with the size of growth opportunities. Thus, if ﬁrms optimally control the geog-
raphy of ownership, we should observe a positive correlation between (i) the size of growth
opportunities and (ii) the fraction of global trading taking place in the foreign market for
cross-listed ﬁrms (as this fraction is a proxy for α). Halling et al.(2003) ﬁnd that this is
indeed the case empirically.
How could ﬁrms control the geography of their ownership? Advertising campaigns can
be one way to achieve this objective. Grullon et al. (2004) show that ﬁrms with greater
advertising expenditures have a larger number of shareholders (institutional and retail).
Interestingly they also ﬁnd that the impact of advertising expenditures on retail investors
is larger. These results suggest that a ﬁrm could increase its base of unsophisticated
shareholders in a foreign market by advertising campaigns speciﬁcally targeted to foreign
19investors.19 In fact, Grullon et al. (2004) describe the case of a Japanese ﬁrm listed on the
NYSE which launched extensive advertising campaigns in the U.S. with the explicit goal
of attracting new investors. Another possibility is to buy additional investment banking
services, such as ﬁnancial analysts coverage or market-making, that help to maintain the
ﬁrm’s visibility among foreign retail investors.
4 The Cross-Listing Decision with Informational In-
tegration
Now we consider the polar case in which information linkages between markets L and
F are perfect: dealers can instantaneously reﬂect into their prices information about the
trading process in the other market. This case has not been formally analyzed in the
literature on multi-market trading (e.g. Chowdry and Nanda (1991) only consider the
case in which markets are segmented). In this section, we index all endogenous variables
with superscript i as they take diﬀerent values from those obtained when markets are
informationally segmented. For instance, Mci∗ denotes the number of informed investors
when the ﬁrm is cross-listed and markets are informationally integrated.
We consider linear equilibria in which the price schedule writes
P
i(OL,OF) = E(˜ V | ˜ O
i
L = OL, e O
i





We obtain the following result.20
Proposition 6 : When there is informational integration and the ﬁrm is cross-listed,
there is a linear equilibrium in which dealers post the price schedule
P
i(OL,OF) = ¯ V + λ
∗i(OL + OF),


































19These advertising campaigns are also likely to boost sales abroad. This might explain why Halling
et al.(2003) also ﬁnd that the proportion of sales in the foreign market positively aﬀects the fraction of
global trading accounted by the foreign market.
20We omit the proof of this result for brevity. It can be obtained upon request.
20and the sophisticated shareholder trades exclusively in Market L. Finally, in equilibrium,
the number of informed investors is the same as when the ﬁrm is not cross-listed, Mci∗ =
Mnc∗.
The properties of the market are identical to those obtained with a single listing. In
particular, in equilibrium, the depth of each market is identical to the depth of the market












This implies that the trading losses of liquidity traders are identical when the ﬁrm is cross-
listed and when it is not. Moreover, with informational integration, the total trade size of
informed investors does not depend on whether the ﬁrm is cross-listed or not as:
M





L )δ = M
nc∗β
∗(1)δ.
Intuitively, with informational integration, dealers in each market reﬂect instantaneously
into their prices the information contained in the order ﬂow directed to the competing
market. Hence, informed traders lose the possibility of exploiting “twice” their information
and behave as if trading was taking place in a single arena. But then a cross-listing has








As Mci∗ = Mnc∗, we deduce that I(P c
2) = I(P nc
2 ). The next proposition follows directly
from these remarks.
Proposition 7 : With informational integration, the informativeness of the stock price is
not aﬀected by the cross-listing decision. Thus, it is never optimal for a ﬁrm to cross-list
if Σ > 0.
With perfect informational integration, ﬁrms have no incentives to cross-list at all. In
reality, trading mechanisms often make it impossible for liquidity suppliers to condition
their quotes on concomitant order ﬂow in competing markets. Thus, the case with informa-
tional integration is best seen as a polar case. In reality, however, technological advances
have accelerated the speed at which quote and trades data in one market are available
in competing markets. The logic of the model suggests that this acceleration decreases
the proﬁtability for informed trading, price informativeness and thereby the beneﬁts of a
21cross-listing. Pagano et al.(2002) point out that there has been a decline in the number of
European cross-listings over the 90s’. They note:
”When it comes to cross-listings, the most dynamic and outward-oriented European
companies self-select U.S. exchanges. The main remaining puzzle is why European ex-
changes are judged to be less attractive by this group”
The model suggests to consider increased informational integration among European eq-
uity exchanges as a possible cause for the decline in the number of European cross-listings.
This hypothesis also implies that exchanges could oppose the process of informational inte-
gration. Actually, this process decreases their ability to attract cross-listings and thereby
to generate revenues from cross-listings.21
5 Testable Implications
We now discuss in more detail the implications of our model for empirical work on cross-
listings.
Cross-listings, Price Informativeness and Price Volatility. A key eﬀect of a
cross-listing in our model is to enhance price informativeness. Thus, following a cross-
listing, the stock price should be more volatile as it reﬂects more information.22 To formal-




2 − V ) = V ar(E(e δ | P
k
2 )) = I(P
k
2 ), (21)
where the second from the properties of normal variables. Thus, Proposition 2 implies that
V ar(P
nc
2 − V ) < V ar(P
c
2 − V ). (22)
Jayaranan, Shastri and Tandon (1993), Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998), Bailey,
Karolyi and Salva (2005) ﬁnd that price volatility increases when ﬁrms become cross-
listed. Interestingly, Domowitz et al.(1998) show that the increase in volatility is unrelated
to changes in liquidity and trading activity. They therefore conclude that the change in
volatility reﬂects a change in information structure, in line with the logic of our model.
21Interestingly, Pagano et al.(2002) ﬁnd that European ﬁrms that cross-list in the U.S. appear to have
higher growth rates compared to European ﬁrms that cross-list in Europe. This is consistent with our
hypothesis as the model implies that informational beneﬁts of a cross-listing in informationally integrated
markets are small. Thus, getting more precise information from stock prices might not be the chief
motivation of European ﬁrms that cross-list in Europe.
22See Freedman (1991) for a similar ﬁnding.
22More recently, several authors (e.g. Durnev et al.(2004), Chen et al. (2005)) have
used ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variations as a proxy for price informativeness (as initially
suggested by Roll (1988)). This is consistent with Equation (21). Intuitively, incorporation
of the information revealed during the trading process into prices raises price volatility.
The model implies that measures of ﬁrm speciﬁc return variations should be larger after
a ﬁrm cross-lists. This prediction is supported by the empirical ﬁndings of Fernandes and
Ferreira (2005). For a large sample of ﬁrms cross-listed in the U.S., they show that a
cross-listing results in larger idiosyncratic volatility for ﬁrms from developed countries.
The model further predicts a relationship between the change in idiosyncratic volatility
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Corollary 1 implies that the change in price informativeness (the R.H.S of the last equation)
is larger when α gets closer to 50%. Thus, the model implies that the change in price
volatility following a cross-listing should increase when the allocation of ownership between
foreign and domestic unsophisticated shareholders becomes more even (or equivalently
when the market share of, say, the foreign market gets closer to 50%).
Cross-listings and the sensitivity of investment decisions to stock price. In
our model, a cross-listing enhances stock price informativeness and enables managers to
make more eﬃcient investment decision. Thus, the sensitivity of investment decisions to
stock prices should be larger for cross-listed ﬁrms. Indeed, Equation (18) implies that the







, k ∈ {c,nc} (24)
where τη is the precision of managerial information (s2) and τk is the precision of the in-
formation contained in stock price in regime k. Thus the sensitivity of ﬁrms’ investment
decisions (i) increases with the informativeness of the stock price and (ii) is larger when
the ﬁrm is cross-listed because the stock price is more informative in this case, i.e. τc > τnc.
Chen et al.(2005) provide evidences supporting the ﬁrst implication (they ﬁnd that the
sensitivity of investment to the stock price increases with measures of price informative-
ness). The second implication is speciﬁc our theory of cross-listings and could be used to
test it (using, for instance, the methodology developed in Chen et al.(2005)).
The Sensitivity of the Cross-Listing Premium to Growth Opportunities. As
discussed in Section 3, several studies have shown that the cross-listing premium increases
with the size of growth opportunities (e.g. Doidge et al. (2004)). Our model has this
23property (∂∆V
∂S > 0) and yields several predictions regarding the determinants of the sen-
sitivity of the cross-listing premium to the size of growth opportunities, as shown by the
next proposition.
Proposition 8 :The sensitivity of the cross-listing premium to the size of the growth op-
portunity (∂∆V
∂S ) depends on :
1. The structure of ownership (Φ) and the geography of ownership (α). Speciﬁcally, this
sensitivity decreases when α goes from 0.5 to 1 and it increases with Φ.
2. The precision of managerial information. Speciﬁcally, this sensitivity increases when
σ2
η increases (i.e. when s2 is less precise).
A cross-listing in our model allows ﬁrm managers to exploit more eﬃciently their growth
opportunities. Thus, any changes that reinforces the impact of the cross-listing on the
eﬃciency of managerial decisions enhances the sensitivity of the cross-listing premium to
the size of growth opportunities. A decrease in the quality of managerial information has
this eﬀect because it makes stock price information relatively more valuable. A more even
allocation of ownership between foreign and domestic unsophisticated investors makes the
impact of a cross-listing on price informativeness larger and is thereby conducive to more
eﬃcient investment decisions in their growth opportunities for cross-listed ﬁrms.
The implications of Proposition 8 could be tested by allowing the eﬀect of growth op-
portunities (proxied by industry Tobin-q or past sales growth) on the cross-listing premium
to interact with ownership variables and measures of the quality of managerial information.
As they are speciﬁc to our theory, they oﬀer a way to distinguish it from other explanations
of the cross-listing premium (e.g. the bonding hypothesis).
Cross-listing premium and trading location dynamics. Some empirical studies
(e.g. Doidge et al.(2004) and Levine and Schmukler (2004)) have studied the evolution
of the cross-listing premium after the cross-listing date. Doidge et al. (2004) ﬁnds that
this premium persists even years after the listing date while Levine and Schmukler (2004)
obtain opposite ﬁndings.23 ﬁnd that the positive price eﬀect of a cross-listing does not last.
In fact, they even document a long run negative eﬀect of cross-listing on stock valuations.
Our model suggests to relate the evolution of the cross-listing premium to changes in the
geography of ownership. In particular, for ﬁrms with large growth opportunities, the cross-
listing premium should decrease when trading gravitates to only to one market (α gets
closer to 1 in our model). In contrast, for ﬁrms with relatively small growth opportunities,
23Foerster and Karolyi (1999) ﬁnd a negative long run abnormal performance for cross-listed stocks.
24the cross-listing premium should increase as trading concentration in one market gets
larger.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a new theory of cross-listings. We show that a cross-listing enhances
price informativeness and thereby increases managers’ ability to take advantage of their
growth opportunities. Accordingly, ﬁrms with suﬃciently large growth opportunities cross-
list and the value of a cross-listed ﬁrm is larger than, otherwise similar, non-cross-listed
ﬁrms. This cross-listing premium increases in the size of growth opportunities and is
inversely related to the quality of managerial information.
The theory has a rich set of testable implications. In particular, it implies that the sensi-
tivity of investment decisions to stock price should increase after a cross-listing. Moreover,
it predicts that the sensitivity of the cross-listing premium to the size of growth opportu-
nities depends on the ownership base of cross-listed ﬁrms. In particular, this sensitivity
should increase as ownership becomes more evenly distributed among foreign and domestic
retail investors. Last, it suggests to explain time-series variations in the cross-listing pre-
mium by variations in the ownership base of the ﬁrm or the allocation of trading activity
between the foreign and the domestic market. For instance, ﬁrms with relatively small
growth opportunities should experience an increase in the cross-listing premium when (i)
holdings become less evenly distributed between foreign and domestic retail investors or
(ii) trading concentrates either in the domestic or the foreign market. Testing these impli-
cations could help to better understand the reasons for which ﬁrms choose to cross-list.
A cross-listing in U.S. markets obliges ﬁrms to additional disclosures, as they must
reconcile their accounting statements with U.S GAAP. These disclosures can result in an
increase in public information available to investors and thereby lower the proﬁtability of
acquiring private information. In our framework, this eﬀect would lessen the increase in
informed traders’ proﬁts following a cross-listing and could even outweigh it for some ﬁrms.
An interesting question is to identify the type of ﬁrms for which the disclosure eﬀect is
strong enough to reduce informed trading and thereby stock price informativeness.24 This
would help to better delineate the set of cross-listed ﬁrms for which our theory is most
likely to apply.
24In the case of emerging countries, Fernandes and Ferreira (2005) ﬁnd a reduction in idiosyncratic
volatility following a cross-listing. One possibility (discussed by Fernandes and Ferreira (2005)) is that,
for emerging markets, the disclosure eﬀect is very strong because accounting standards are more lenient
or not well enforced in emerging countries.
257 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
In a linear equilibrium, dealers’ price schedules in exchanges L and F are given by
P(OL) = ¯ V + λLOL,
P(OF) = ¯ V + λFOF,
with λj,j ∈ {L,F}, ﬁnite and strictly positive (this is necessary and suﬃcient for both
exchanges to be active). Informed investor k’s trading strategy in market j is given by :
Qkj(δ) = βkjδ, for k ∈ {1,...,M










βl j ∈ {L,F}. (27)
It is immediate that :
Q−kj = β−kjδ j ∈ {L,F}. (28)
We proceed in 3 steps. First we derive the optimal trading strategies of the informed
investors and the sophisticated investor (steps 1 and 2 respectively) for given values of λL
and λF. Then (step 3), we derive the closed-form solution for λL and λF in equilibrium.
Step 1: Given dealers’ price schedules in markets L and F and other informed traders’
strategies, an informed investor chooses QkL and QkF in order to maximize his total ex-
pected proﬁt. Thus his order placement strategy solves:
Max{QkL,QkF}E(QkL(˜ V − p(OL)) | ˜ δ = δ) + E(QkF(˜ V − p(OF)) | ˜ δ = δ),
which rewrites:
Max{QkL,QkF}QkL(δ − λL(QkL + Q−kL)) + QkF(δ − λF(QkF + Q−kF)).







for j ∈ {L,F}.






26This implies that :
βkj = βj, ∀k, for j ∈ {L,F}.
Using Equation (29) and the deﬁnition of β−kj, we deduce that in equilibrium :
βj =
(1 − (Mc − 1)λjβj)
2λj
.




, for j ∈ {L,F}.
Step 2: The sophisticated shareholder chooses his order in market j, Zjs, in order to
maximize his total expected proﬁt, under the constraint that he must trade Zs shares. His
order placement strategy solves:





u.c. : ZLs + ZFs = Zs,






u.c. : ZLs + ZFs = Zs.






Zs, for j ∈ {L,F}. (30)
Step 3. In equilibrium, dealers’ price schedules are such that:
p(Oj) = E(˜ V | ˜ Oj = Oj).
Given the sophisticated investor strategy and informed traders’ strategies, Oj is normally
distributed. Hence :
E(˜ V | ˜ Oj = Oj) = ¯ V + λjOj,
with
λj =
Cov(˜ V , ˜ Oj)









, j ∈ {L,F}.



























The linear equilibrium is completely characterized by the pairs (λL,λF) solving this system
of equations. When α ∈ [0.5,1), σ2
F > 0 and σ2
L > 0. In this case, it is straightforward
to check that (λ∗
L(α),λ∗
F(α)), as given in Lemma 1, is the unique solution of the previous














We now consider the case in which α = 1 and the ﬁrm is cross-listed. In this case,
σ2
F = 0 and σ2
L = Φσ2









































This is impossible since σ2
L > 0. Thus there is no equilibrium in which the two exchanges
are active (λj is ﬁnite) and ωF > 0 when α = 1. In this case, it is immediate to check that
there is an equilibrium in which λ∗
F = ∞, w∗
F = 0, β∗













The solution of this equation is λ∗
L = λ∗
L(1). Thus, in this case, β∗
L = β∗
L(1).
Proof of Lemma 2
28When the ﬁrm does not cross-list, all the trading necessarily takes place in market
L. Thus we impose wF = 0 and βF = 0. This is in fact the outcome when the ﬁrm is
cross-listed and α = 1. Thus the equilibrium values for λ∗
L and β∗
L must be identical to
those obtained when the ﬁrm is cross-listed and the number of informed traders is Mnc.
Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium number of informed traders when the ﬁrm is cross-listed solves
Πc(α,Φ,Mc∗)
Mc∗ = C.
Πc(.)/Mc∗ decreases with α, increases with Φ and decreases with Mc∗. It immediately
follows that the equilibrium number of informed traders decreases with α and increases
with Φ when the ﬁrm is cross-listed. Furthermore, the number of investors when the ﬁrm
is not cross-listed solves :
Πnc(1,Φ,Mnc∗)
Mnc∗ = C.
It follows that the equilibrium number of informed investors when the ﬁrm is not cross-
listed is equal to the equilibrium number of informed investors when the ﬁrm is cross-listed
and α = 1, i.e. Mnc∗ = Mc∗(1). As Mc∗(α) > Mc∗(1), we deduce that the number of
informed investors is larger when the ﬁrm is cross-listed than when it is not.
Proof of Proposition 2
Case1 : the ﬁrm is cross-listed.
Using the fact that δ, P c
L and P c
F are normally distributed and standard results about

















where F is a constant given by:
F =
(Mc∗ + 1)






We skip the formal derivation of this result for brevity. Clearly, P c
2 has a normal distribu-
tion as Oc
L and Oc





2) = V ar(E(e δ | P
c
2))
We deduce from Equation (33) that
V ar(E(δ | P
c
2)) = F


















































F by their expressions given in Lemma 1 and
simplifying, we obtain :












Then substituting F by its expression and simplifying we obtain :
I(P
c











Using the deﬁnitions of σ2
s, σ2
L and σ2
F (see Equations (5), (6) and (7)), we obtain ﬁnally











Case 2 : the ﬁrm is not cross-listed.
In this case, we obtain :
I(P
nc







Observe that, for a ﬁxed Mc∗, V ar(E(e δ | P c
2)) (i) decreases with α (for α ∈ [0.5,1]) and
increases with Φ. Thus, a lower bound for I(P c
2) is obtained by setting α = 1 and Φ = 0
in Equation (34). This lower bound is
Mc∗σ2
δ




Mc∗ > Mnc∗. Thus, I(P c
2) > I(P nc
2 ).
Proof of Corollary 1
The expression of I(P c
2) as a function of α and Φ is given by Equation (34). Let this












It is immediate that ∂Ic
∂Mc∗ > 0 and that ∂Ic
∂α < 0 for α ∈ [0.5,1]. Moreover, we know from
Proposition 1 that ∂Mc∗
∂α < 0 for α ∈ [0.5,1]. We deduce that dIc












∂Φ > 0 and ∂Mc∗
∂Φ > 0 for α ∈ [0.5,1], we deduce that dIc
dΦ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3
From normal theory, we obtain that:
V ar(E(e δ | e s2,P
k
2 )) = σ
2
δ − V ar(e δ | e s2,P
k





, for k ∈ {c,nc}, (36)
where τη = (σ2
η)−1 (the precision of signal η) and τk = (V ar(e δ | P k
2 ))−1. Moreover,









Substituting τk by this expression in Equation (36) and simplifying, we obtain:
V ar(E(e δ | e s2,P
k








δ − I(P k
2 )
), for k ∈ {c,nc} (37)
The expression for the expected value of the growth opportunity directly follows from this
equation and Equation (19). It is immediate that ∂EGk
∂I(Pk
2 ) > 0 if σ2
η > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
First, recall that I(P c
2) > I(P nc
2 ) (Proposition 2) and that ∂EGk
∂I(Pk
2 ) > 0 (Lemma 3). We
deduce that EGc > EGnc. Moreover, I(P c
2 ) decreases with α, for α ∈ [0.5,1) and increases
with Φ. This implies that EGc decreases with α, for α ∈ [0.5,1) and increases with Φ as
well. As EGnc does not depend on these variables, we deduce that the eﬀect of α and Φ on
∆EG is as described in the proposition. Finally, direct calculations show that ∂∆EG
∂σ2
η > 0.
Proof of Proposition 2
Observe that
∆V = S(
V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P c






Moreover, from Equation (37) in the proof of Lemma 3, we deduce that:
V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P
c
2))−V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P
nc


















δ − I(P nc
2 )
)
Observe that V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P c
2)) − V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P nc
2 ) and C(Mnc∗ − Mc∗) are determined
by all exogenous parameter values, but S. Moreover, observe that V ar(E(e δ | e s2,P c
2)) >
V ar(E(e δ | e s2,P nc
2 )) because I(P c
2) > I(P nc
2 ) (Proposition 2). Therefore (i) ∆V increases












V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P c
2)) − V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P nc
2 )
31such that ∆V ≥ 0 iﬀ S ≥ S∗(α,Φ,σ2
δ,σ2
Z,σ2
η,C). Finally, we note that σ2
η does not aﬀect
the number of informed traders in equilibrium and that (V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P c
2)) − V ar(E(˜ δ |
e s2,P nc
2 )) increases with σ2
η. We deduce that S∗ decreases with σ2
η.
Proof of Proposition 7
The expected value of the growth opportunity is given by (see Equation (19)):
EG
ki =
SV ar(E(˜ δ | s2,P k
2 ))
2
, for k ∈ {c,nc}.
We deduce from Equation (37) in the proof of Lemma 3 that:










δ − I(P k
2 )
), for k ∈ {c,nc}.
Now, as I(P c
2) = I(P nc
2 ) (see text), we immediately deduce that, with informational inte-
gration, the expected value of the growth opportunity is identical when the ﬁrm is cross-




















where the last equality follows from Equation (11). Thus, the expected trading losses of
liquidity traders are identical whether the ﬁrm is cross-listed or not when markets are
informationally integrated. We deduce that:
V
c − V
nc = −Σ < 0 if Σ > 0.
Thus, it is never optimal to cross-list when markets are informationally integrated.
Proof of Proposition 8




V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P c
2)) − V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P nc
2 ))
2
Using the expression for V ar(E(˜ δ | e s2,P k






















δ − I(P nc
2 )
)) (39)
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 8 obtains by diﬀerentiating Equation (39) with respect to
α and Φ after substituting I(P c
2) by its expression given in Equation (15) (I(P nc
2 ) does
not depend on α and Φ). The second part of Proposition 8 is obtained by diﬀerentiating
Equation (39) with respect to σ2
η (observing that I(P k
2 ) does not depend on σ2
η).
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